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When Detroit became the largest city in U.S. history to fi le for bankruptcy, it was a bad thing—
unless you have the unique world-view of  a bankruptcy lawyer, in which case it was marvelous 
news, worthy of  celebration.
It’s not the fee-generating potential for the Brotherhood that causes bankruptcy lawyers to delight 
in Detroit’s fi ling. It is that the city fi nally was forced to confront its unsustainable economic path. 
That’s what bankruptcy is all about.
Starting with some basic numbers, on a good year, Detroit can raise about a billion dollars or so 
in tax revenue. The problem is that it has accrued about $18 billion in debt (pension, bond, and 
otherwise). That means even if  it cut every single city service—and residents still chose to remain 
and pay taxes in such an unusual place—it would take more than a decade to work it all off. 
Many are agitated about allocating the blame; some complain of  widespread fi nancial 
incompetence in prior municipal administrations; others point to the macroeconomic trends 
fueling massive depopulation of  the nation’s manufacturing hubs. All talk past each other. We are 
where we are: an unsupportable debt overhang crippling a city that is trying desperately to 
reinvent itself  before a demographic death spiral sets in.
This is where bankruptcy law comes in. Anyone can go broke, but only some get to declare 
bankruptcy. One power of  bankruptcy law—specifi cally, its reorganization branch—is to breathe 
new life into struggling debtors by reducing debt pursuant to consensual creditor resolution. 
Chapter 11 is world-renowned for its capacity to do just that, capturing the genius of  super-
majoritarian contract modifi cation. When Gov. Rick Snyder, ’82, appointed Kevyn Orr, ’83, as 
emergency fi nancial manager, Orr engaged the major creditor constituencies almost immediately.
But he faced two problems: one generic to fi nancial default negotiations and one specifi c to 
Detroit. The generic problem is the premise of  reorganization law. Creditors holding contract 
rights cannot be forced into concessions. Thus, in multi-party talks (Detroit has tens of  thousands 
of  creditors), there is massive holdup potential. Bankruptcy law allows a super-majority, subject to 
certain safeguards, to bind dissidents to accept a deal that the collective thinks is fair.
Detroit also faced a special problem with unfunded pension liabilities. The Michigan Constitution 
contains a provision purporting to preclude the impairment of  pensions, suggesting strongly that 
Orr would be powerless to insist upon pension cuts, as would indeed the Legislature, in these 
negotiation talks.
Filing for “adjustment” in chapter 9—a municipal analogue to corporate reorganization in 
chapter 11—allowed Orr both to tap into bankruptcy’s voting rules and, arguably and 
contentiously, to bypass the Michigan constitutional protection. Given that the pension and 
health care labor debts constitute billions of  dollars of  Detroit’s liabilities, the ability to modify 
pension obligations is crucial.
Debt restructuring in successful chapter 11s—and in successful chapter 9s—is only half  of  the 
equation. What is equally important is a sustainable go-forward business plan. All cities can do is 
raise—or, in Detroit’s case, preserve—the tax base. Yes, it can cut services as population dwindles 
to pare costs, but there are certain fi xed costs that cannot be cut. Recognizing this touchstone of  
reorganization, the city, through Orr, and indeed the bankruptcy judge (Michigan Law Lecturer 
Steven Rhodes, ’73, who holds ultimate authority over confi rming the plan), have been focused 
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on what the plan for the future is regarding (a) sustainable budgeting, including annual operating 
expenses well within revenue targets and with a margin for debt service, and (b) providing for 
long-deferred capital expenditures. That’s right, the bankruptcy judge wants to make sure Detroit 
will incur enough new debt as part of  its plan to deal with its old debt; this outlay is on the order 
of  magnitude of  a billion dollars.
This last point is one that bankruptcy types take seriously. Nobody wants a failed reorganization; 
the key to success starts with a truly accurate assessment of  fi nancial needs. Budgetary realism 
has been the hallmark of  few municipal governments, and so Detroit’s plan needs to convince the 
bankruptcy judge in the short term, and the bond markets in the long term, that a sustainable 
level of  expenditures is being fi nanced, both recurring operations and long-deferred 
infrastructure projects.
How does this all shake out with Detroit’s plan in particular? The two big creditor constituencies 
are the bondholders and the labor groups (workers and retirees, unionized and not). The 
bondholders—or more precisely, their insurance underwriters—are looking at well over a 50 
percent haircut on their principal, as of  the time this article is going to press, based on the most 
recent amended plan that has been submitted for creditor consideration. The workers will hurt 
less—but will still hurt—because of  an external cash injection from an interesting syndicate of  
rich foundations based well outside Detroit and a Michigan governor running for re-election. The 
better part of  a billion dollars will be thrown in, exclusively to go to pensioners, by these groups 
in exchange for the city relinquishing its claims to the artwork at the Detroit Institute of  Arts. 
These groups have said they’ll throw in this money if  the parties agree to a consensual plan (i.e., 
there are enough votes to confi rm the plan) and the art is left untouched and protected for future 
generations.
Will it work out? Most likely, yes. Hardened bankruptcy lawyers will tell you consensual plans are 
the norm in bankruptcy and “cramdown”—a backup procedure for still confi rming a plan even 
without the requisite voting thresholds met—is the exception. In fact, it’s not entirely clear what 
cramdown even means in a chapter 9. In chapter 11, it means the shareholders are all wiped out 
and the creditors take over the company. There is no analogue in chapter 9 because there are no 
shareholders to wipe out, and private creditors can’t own a public governmental entity.
Even if  likely, it will not be a smooth road to confi rmation. The unions are angry because they 
don’t think their pensions should have been impaired in the fi rst place; they are appealing the 
bankruptcy court’s interpretation of  the Michigan Constitution to the Sixth Circuit. The bond 
underwriters are angry because they don’t think they should be taking it more on the chin than 
the unions; they have asked for more discovery on the appraisals of  the DIA, signaling their 
continued belief  they are entitled to liquidate those assets. The bondholders will scream that the 
city will never get fi nancing again in the bond markets. (It will.) The unions will scream that 
everyone will quit. (They won’t.) Chapter 9, much like chapter 11, much like corporate 
negotiations generally come to think of  it, involves no small amount of  posturing bravado. 
They’ll get there.
Bankruptcy law can do a lot, like help recover a fundamentally sound business enterprise that has 
been overburdened by debt. But it cannot design cars that people want to drive or make residents 
want to live and pay taxes in a city. The true challenge for Detroit is not whether it will confi rm 
a chapter 9 plan of  adjustment, or not even whether it can stick to the new fi nancial regime that 
plan proposes. It is whether the city leaders, who will remain long after Kevyn Orr has left, can 
design a vibrant urban renewal plan, undistracted by the travails of  fi nancial default. Bankruptcy 
can help them escape that distraction, but it cannot deposit creativity into brains.
Professor John A. E. Pottow is an internationally recognized expert in bankruptcy and commercial law. He has 
taught at Michigan Law since 2003.
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